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NOTES
RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE: CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT AS A VEHICLE FOR REFORM
TIMOTHYJ. PILLARI*
As of October 3, 2005, ninety-seven hundred Americans
were serving life sentences in adult penitentiaries-one-fifth of
those without the chance of parole-for crimes they committed
before they reached the age of eighteen.1 While today many
Americans may not find this shocking or even unjust,2 the
reformers at the turn of the twentieth century who worked stren-
uously for the creation of a separate and independent court sys-
tem to adjudicate juvenile crime would have been dismayed by
such a statistic. Indeed, for a system in which rehabilitation and
reintegration were originally the sole aims, the common, modern
juvenile court procedure of waiving certain crimes to adult crimi-
nal court for prosecution would have been considered antitheti-
cal to the entire venture.' As the Progressive reformers
envisioned the juvenile adjudicatory process, judicial actors were
to "take [the juvenile offender] in charge, not so much to punish
as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2008;
B.A. University of Notre Dame, 2003.
1. Adam Liptak, Locked Away Forever After Crimes as Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2005, at Al.
2. A recent poll taken in Florida found that 28% of citizens polled
favored the trial of those fourteen and older as adults, 13% favored adult trial at
age fifteen and above, and another 28% favored adult trial at age sixteen and
above; altogether, 69% favored adult trial of those sixteen and older. Libby
Fairhurst, FSU Researchers: Public Favors Juvenile Justice System (Feb. 19,
2007), http://www.fsu.edu/news/2007/02/19/juvenile.justice/.
3. See ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAvERs 69 (2d ed. 1977) (illustrat-
ing the reformers' views on the primacy of rehabilitation and reintegration).
Some states allow waiver of children into adult court at any age if a child is
charged with a serious enough offense. See, e.g., Lisa Beresford, Note, Is Lower-
ing the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer
to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 783, 800 n.135
(2000) (citing Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Missouri, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Carolina as examples).
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develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen."4 A
juvenile offender was seen merely as the product of his environ-
ment; the child had engaged in criminal activity, it was thought,
only because of a lack of moral instruction and sound guidance.5
Naturally then, punishing the child was viewed as unjustified;
more so, locking a juvenile away for the remainder of her natural
life, as is often done today, would have been considered
unconscionable.
Today, the treatment of juvenile offenders in the United
States centers not on rehabilitation and reintegration but rather
on retribution and deterrence as guiding principles.6 Instead of
viewing a juvenile criminal as an innocent byproduct of a detri-
mental social or family setting (as the Progressives would have),
juvenile delinquents are largely treated in the adjudicatory pro-
cess as self-determinate decision makers, fully responsible for
their conduct. The language used to describe these juveniles has
markedly changed-no longer is the juvenile delinquent
thought of as one capable of being formed as a "worthy citizen"
to be nurtured and assisted along the way,7 but rather as a
"super-predator" to be guarded against, often discarded by soci-
ety to a life behind bars.8
4. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1910).
5. See H. Warren Dunham, The Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orientations in
Processing Offenders, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 508, 525 (1958) ("[T]he social-
agency image [of juvenile court] has been the more dominant [during the
court's sixty years of existence] .... [This image] may be seen when an emi-
nent judge describes the juvenile court as comparable to a hospital or clinic
where the 'sick' patient is diagnosed, hospitalized, treated, and
discharged .... ").
6. Brandi Miles Moore, Comment, Blended Sentencing for Juveniles: The Cre-
ation of a Third CriminalJustice System?, 22J.Juv. L. 126, 129 (2001-2002). As one
concrete example of the change, California's Proposition 21, passed in 2000,
revamped California's juvenile justice system by imposing harsher punishments
on violentjuvenile offenders. See Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention
Act of 1998, CAL. PENAL CODE § 182.5 (West 2007).
7. See supra text accompanying note 4.
8. Noted scholarJohn Dilulio is credited with coining the phrase "super-
predators," writing: "On the horizon, therefore, there are tens of thousands of
severely morally impoverished juvenile super-predators .... [F]or as long as
their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes 'naturally': murder,
rape, rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high." John J. Dilulio
Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLy STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23. The
potential punishment forjuveniles was of course much more severe until 2005,
when the United States Supreme Court declared in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 575 (2005), that sentencing to death an offender who was under eighteen
years old at the time of the crime committed is cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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While the reasons for drastic modification of the structure
and aims of the juvenile courts over the past century are many
and varied,9 threaded throughout the history of the courts has
been a tension between the aims of rehabilitation and reintegra-
tion on the one hand and retribution, deterrence, and public
safety on the other. This struggle is often posed as a battle
between the child's welfare and societal control. ° While the
Progressives looked past both the societal effects of a juvenile's
crime and his accountability for such behavior, focusing instead
on reintegrating the juvenile into society, the modern trend in
the "get tough" legislation of the past couple of decades is to
focus largely on the juvenile's personal accountability for the
crime committed and on public safety concerns. 1 Otherwise
stated, in the treatment of juvenile offenders, the pendulum has
swung from an exclusive focus on individual responsibility prior
to the creation of the juvenile courts, 2 to an absolute focus on
rehabilitation and reintegration, and now back again to a model
that emphasizes individual responsibility and self-determination,
in the interests of public safety. In this Note, I will argue neither
approach alone is satisfactory in seeking the common good.
Rather, I will argue that the seemingly conflicting aims of retribu-
tion, individual responsibility, and deterrence on the one hand
and rehabilitation and societal reintegration on the other, are in
fact reconcilable, and that the social teachings of the Catholic
Church-while not providing a blueprint for reform-set forth
sound principles for retooling the juvenile justice system to
embrace both sets of aims. In effect, these principles provide a
vehicle for the creation of a more just and humane mode of
treatment of youth offenders.
9. See infra Part II for a discussion of some of the factors involved.
10. Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Waiver into Adult Criminal Court: A Conflict
of Interests Violation Amounting to the States' Legislative Abrogation of Juveniles' Due
Process Rights, 110 PENN. ST. L. REv. 233, 268 n.208 (2005); seeAdam D. Kamen-
stein, The Inner-Morality ofJuvenile Justice: The Case for Consistency and Legality, 18
CARDozo L. REV. 2105, 2105 (1997) (arguing that there is an "insurmountable
struggle" between those who are "focused on the welfare of the child" and those
who are seeking to "hold[ I the child accountable").
11. Michael F. Aloisi, Emerging Trends in Juvenile Justice, inJUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY: HISTORICAL, THEORETICAL, AND SOCIETAL REACTIONS TO YOUTH 424, 427
(Paul M. Sharp & Barry W. Hancock eds., 2d ed. 1998). "Get tough" legislation,
though taking different forms among the states, most often seeks to "remov[e]
certain categories of juveniles from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and
decreas[e] the broad discretion ofjudges and other juvenile justice personnel."
Id.
12. Prior to the creation of a separate court system, juvenile offenders
were treated no differently than their adult counterparts. Kamenstein, supra
note 10, at 2108-09.
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In Part I, I will discuss at greater length the origins of juve-
nile justice and its progression from a purely rehabilitative model
to the modern "get tough" movements. Part II will then analyze
the current emphasis on individual responsibility and self-deter-
mination, and the sources and factors that play into this current
emphasis. Finally, in Part III, I will introduce the central tenets of
Catholic Social Teaching as providing a conciliatory voice
between these two sets of values. In this section, I will contend
that if human dignity is recognized as an inviolable starting point
in formulating juvenile justice policy, and if the principles of soli-
darity and subsidiarity are likewise put into practice both at the
governmental and informal social and familial levels, then these
seemingly contradictory sets of values can be merged.
I. THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Progressive Era and the Formation of the Juvenile Court
The juvenile court marked its official beginnings with the
passage of the Illinois Juvenile Justice Court Act in 1899."3
Spurred by great dissatisfaction with the societal response to
troubled youths, renegades such as Dorothea Dix, and later Jane
Addams, advocated for a more compassionate treatment of
juveniles, who were often subject to severe punishment-if not
by the court system, then by parents or by religious communi-
ties.14 The new court system, which quickly spread from Illinois
to the rest of the country, took on the role of parens patriae-that
is, it was shaped with a wholly protective motive for the delin-
quent child. 5 Julian Mack, an early leader in the juvenile justice
movement, famously framed the aims of the juvenile court in this
way:
To get away from the notion that the child is to be dealt
with as a criminal;... to take it in hand and instead of first
stigmatizing and then reforming it, to protect it from the
stigma, -this is the work which is now being accomplished
by dealing even with most of the delinquent children
through the court that represents the parens patriae power
of the state, the court of chancery. Proceedings are
brought to have a guardian or representative of the state
look after the child, to have the state intervene between
the natural parent and the child because the child needs it,
13. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conun-
drum, 51 IASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1272 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Green, supra note 10, at 239.
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as evidenced by some of its acts, and because the parent is
either unwilling or unable to train the child properly. 6
The juvenile court systems in the early twentieth century
barely resembled their adult counterparts. For one, the judge
responsible for making determinations on the fate of the delin-
quent juvenile often interacted with him in a parental manner.
In fact, juvenile judges that sought to reject the traditional high-
seated bench of adult criminal court would physically seat the
child in a chair next to a desk so that the judge could interact
more intimately with him.17 Generally, the judge would attempt
to emphasize his concern, and the system's concern, for thejuve-
nile's well-being."8 In addition, as criminal acts were seen as a
reflection of immaturity, juveniles were not seen as individually
responsible for the crimes they committed. As such, there were
said to be no "criminals" in juvenile court, but only children with
illnesses that required treatment." Thus, the crime that was com-
mitted by the juvenile was often of little relevance in the court's
determination of the treatment required, and juveniles in differ-
ent social circumstances who committed the same crime could
receive markedly differing dispositions.2 ° Other unique features
of the juvenile courts included age-segregated detention facili-
ties, penal sanctions for neglectful or malicious adults, and treat-
ment focused on the child's home and family.
2 1
While the contours of the early juvenile courts may strike the
modern reader as bizarre or even unjust, there is no doubt that
the Progressive reformers who fought for the creation ofjuvenile
courts were motivated by idealistic ends. Dorothea Dix, Jane
Addams, and their contemporaries had witnessed a significant
lack of support for a vulnerable segment of society. The response
of juvenile courts to youth offenders, while perhaps fraught with
problems, was overwhelmingly compassionate. Rather than
ignore the issues that led to juvenile delinquency, and instead of
simply casting the blame upon a youth's shoulders, the Progres-
16. Mack, supra note 4, at 109.
17. Brenda Gordon, A Criminal's Justice or a Child's Injustice? Trends in the
Waiver ofJuvenile Court Jurisdiction and the Flaws in the Arizona Response, 41 Apuz. L.
REv. 193, 198 (1999).
18. Mack, supra note 4, at 120.
19. Kamenstein, supra note 10, at 2114-15.
20. See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punish-
ment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 872-73 (1988)
(reporting a study of juvenile correctional dispositions in Minnesota).
21. STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUsTIcE: REFORM IDE-
ALS AND INSTITUTIONAL REALITIES, 1825-1920, at 62 (2005).
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sive reformers helped spur society to take up the challenge of
solving the underlying problems involved. 22
B. Post-Gault Era and Increased Due Process Rights
While the rehabilitative aims of the early juvenile court sys-
tem were admirable, juvenile courts noticeably lacked the proce-
dural safeguards that were otherwise available to adults in
criminal court. This omission was justified as the lesser of two
evils: retaining flexibility in the court's procedures provided the
most opportune environment for fashioning treatments based on
the needs of the child, as perceived by a juvenile court judge.23
Contrary to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for
example, juveniles were not afforded due process of law before
being deprived of their liberty.24 This changed in 1967, with the
Supreme Court's handing down of In re Gault.25 Gault involved a
fifteen-year-old who was taken into custody pursuant to a com-
plaint by a neighbor that she had received inappropriate tele-
phone calls from him. 26 Gault was neither notified of the charges
against him, nor granted the right to counsel or several other
guaranteed procedural safeguards of the adult criminal court.27
The Court held that the actions taken against Gault were uncon-
stitutional, and that the essentials of due process were required
in juvenile court adjudication.28 Similarly, a year before Gault was
decided, the Supreme Court had taken action to expand the pro-
cedural safeguards of juvenile delinquents. The Court ruled in
Kent v. United States that juvenile waiver orders (providing for
adjudication of the juvenile as an adult) must be grounded in a
hearing, and that a statement of reasons must accompany the
waiver order.29
While providing procedural safeguards forjuvenile adjudica-
tion may be considered a positive step in the protection and wel-
fare of juvenile offenders, the move was also undoubtedly a step
away from the ideals of the juvenile justice system's original
22. Indeed, broad societal acceptance of the Progressive reformers' ideas
was evidenced by similar reforms in education, in the penal system as a whole,
and in care for the mentally ill. Id. at 49.
23. Kamenstein, supra note 10, at 2115.
24. Regardless of whether the disposition of a child in juvenile court was
deemed rehabilitation or punishment, the court order was still a deprivation of
liberty. See generally id.
25. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id. at 33-34.
28. Id. at 41.
29. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560-61 (1966).
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champions. Through the installation of many of the same proce-
dural mechanisms that were provided in adult criminal court,3 °
the distinction between the two sets of systems-and thereby the
distinction in treatment of the individuals before each judicial
body-was bound to fade. No longer would it be possible, for
example, for the juvenile court judge to serve more as a father
figure than as an objective government authority.31
In many ways, this fading in the distinction was not merely a
natural after-effect of Gault and Kent, but rather an intended one.
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court in Gault, noted that juveniles
had previously been getting "the worst of both worlds"-neither
the procedural safeguards of the adult court system nor the reha-
bilitation promised in the juvenile system.32 As Fortas expressed,
skepticism had increased as to the actual rehabilitative effects of
the juvenile court "treatments" due to evidence presented that
suggested poor results. 3 Though in the post-Gault years there
remained a dominant view that juveniles were still lacking in
maturity-reflecting a diminished culpability for crimes commit-
ted, which resulted in less severe punishments than for adults
committing the same crimes 34-juveniles were nonetheless
expected to take greater responsibility for their choices than in
the pre-Gault years.
C. The Modern Era
Since in the 1980s, perspectives on juvenile crime have
moved even further from the rehabilitative ideals of the Progres-
sive Era reformers. The emphasis in the treatment of juvenile
offenders is now almost solely on retributive and deterrent aims
and on protecting society from the criminal behavior of delin-
quent juveniles. 35 Even though it was once a guiding principle in
30. It should be noted that the Supreme Court stopped short of provid-
ing all of the procedural safeguards in juvenile court that were constitutionally
required in adult court. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-550
(1971), the Supreme Court held that there is no right to a trial byjury in juve-
nile adjudications.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 n.23 (1967).
33. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A
Developmental Perspective on juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
137, 145 n.34 (1998).
34. Id. at 145-46.
35. Id. at 148. As one example of the change in policy, compare Juvenile
Court Act, ch. 685, § 1, 1959 Minn. Laws 1275, 1275 (repealed 1980) ("The
purpose of the laws relating to juvenile courts is to secure for each minor under
the jurisdiction of the court the care and guidance, preferably in his own home,
as will serve the spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor
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the juvenile court's response to crime, youthful immaturity has
largely been rejected as a factor of much importance.36 More and
more often, prosecutors and juvenile court judges are transfer-
ring older juveniles to adult court.37 Many states, in fact, have
enacted mandatory transfer statutes for certain crimes commit-
ted by juveniles of a certain age and older.38 Furthermore, the
juvenile court itself has in large part evolved to mirror its adult
counterpart.3 9 The dominant perspective now, as one "get
tough" advocate put it, is that juvenile offenders "are criminals
who happen to be young, not children who happen to commit
crimes."4 Further, the writer states, "there is no reason that soci-
ety should be more lenient with a sixteen-year-old first offender
than a thirty-year-old first offender."41 In sum, society's percep-
tion of juvenile offenders has now completed a 180-degree turn:
rather than focusing on the vulnerability of delinquent youths,
the public attention has centered on the horrific crimes juveniles
are capable of committing and the need to hold them
accountable.42
and the best interests of the state .... .") with Act of May 11, 1999, ch. 139, art. 2,
§ 1, 1999 Minn. Laws 583, 583 ("The purpose of the laws relating to children
alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety and
reduce juvenile delinquency . . ").
36. Scott & Grisso, supra note 33, at 148.
37. David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer:
How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEx. L. REv. 1555, 1555 (2004).
38. Id. One example is California's Proposition 21, discussed supra note 6,
which requires transfer to adult court for juveniles who commit murder or seri-
ous sexual offenses, among other severe crimes. Gang Violence and Juvenile
Crime Prevention Act of 1998, CAL. PENAL CODE § 182.5 (West 2007); see also
Eric J. Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, An Assessment of Legislative Approaches to the
Problem of Serious Juvenile Crime: A Case Study of Texas 1973-1995, 23 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 563, 572 (1996) (noting that juveniles who are at least fifteen years old may
be waived to adult court in a majority of states).
39. One writer notes that the juvenile court's movement towards a close
resemblance of the adult court is "reinforced by the movement towards a more
punitive, 'just desserts' response to juvenile criminality... [with] greater con-
sideration given to the act itself and the protection of society as opposed to the
nature and needs of the juvenile." Kamenstein, supra note 10, at 2125 (footnote
omitted).
40. Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away with Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice Sys-
tem Needs an Overhaul, 34 POE'Sy REv. 65, 65 (1985).
41. Id. at 68.
42. See, e.g., Julie Rowe, Note, Mourning the Untimely Death of the Juvenile
Death Penalty: An Examination of Roper v. Simmons and the Future of the Juvenile
Justice System, 42 CAL. W. L. REv. 287 (2006).
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II. FACTORS CONNECTED TO THE CHANGE IN POLICY
The basis for the change in public policy in juvenile justice
can be pinned on a myriad of factors. First, the simple reality is
that arrest rates overall, including juvenile arrest rates, increased
throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. 4" As this certainly
would be a matter of public concern, reformers not surprisingly
sought modifications to juvenile justice systems.44 In addition,
some of the types of crimes juveniles were committing could
scarcely have been dreamed of by the public imagination a cen-
tury ago. One shocking example of brutality was adjudicated in
Davis v. State.45 In Davis, a seventeen-year-old was convicted for
sodomizing and stabbing a sixty-eight-year-old store owner seven-
teen times.46 The proliferation of youth gun violence in schools,
a recent phenomenon, also surely enhances the view that
juveniles today present a greater danger to society, thus requiring
stiffer measures of punishment to ensure society's protection.47
A second factor, independent of the realities of juvenile
crime, is the public perception of juvenile crime. Even though
juvenile crime rates have steadily dropped since the early
1990s,4" the public commonly believes such rates are on the
rise.49 Likewise, for years the public has perceived the rehabilita-
43. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS 128 (2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojst
atbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf [hereinafter JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS] (reporting that between the mid-1980s and 1993, the juvenile arrest
rate for murder more than doubled); Rowe, supra note 42, at 132 (reporting
that between 1988 and 1994, the violent juvenile crime arrest rate rose by sixty
percent).
44. Interestingly, reputed juvenile law scholar Franklin Zimring contends
that analysis ofjuvenile crime statistics is flawed and that the increase in arrest
rates did not actually correlate with an increase in crime itself, but rather was
the result of a change in the way police report and classify arrests. Recent Trends
in Juvenile Crime Policy Are Driven by Fear, Not Fact, Says a National Expert on Juvenile
Justice, SCIENCE BLOG, Dec. 9, 1998, http://www.scienceblog.com/community/
older/ 1998/A/ 199800520.html.
45. Davis v. State, 554 So. 2d 1094 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984).
46. Id. at 1096.
47. See Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine that Arrived at the Wrong Station:
How to Get Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 401, 402
(1999) (arguing that the public hysteria in response to well-publicized crimes
such as the Columbine High School massacre has been a primary reason for the
"get tough" reforms in the juvenile justice system).
48. Between 1994 and 2003, the percentage of juvenile arrests in the
United States decreased by eighteen percent, including a thirty-two percent
drop in violent crime arrests. JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS, supra note 43, at
128.
49. Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Violence, 31 CRIME & JUST.
495, 495 (2004).
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tive model forjuvenile justice is ineffective.5" Further, despite the
often highly punitive treatment of juveniles, a common percep-
tion is that the juvenile system treats delinquents "with kid gloves
and essentially establish [es] no consequences for their crimes."51
The media has contributed to the perception of juvenile crime,
capturing the public imagination with sensational stories ofjuve-
nile delinquents and casting them in a near sub-human light.
John Dilulio's famous description of juvenile delinquents as
"super-predators" out to terrorize society52 is a prime example of
the media distortion (or at least over-simplification) of juvenile
crime.
Third, treatment ofjuvenile offenders has been affected by a
major transformation in family life over the past few decades.
Several elements have been involved in this transformation. First,
attitudes about sex and reproduction outside of marriage have
changed dramatically since the early 1960s, resulting in an ever-
increasing rate of births outside of marriage. 53 Second, the num-
ber of mothers working full time has drastically increased, leav-
ing fewer parents to stay home to take care of young children. By
the year 2000, only thirty-six percent of married women with chil-
dren under the age of six stayed at home with the children,54
compared to eighty-one percent in 1960.55 Third, the divorce
rate has skyrocketed in recent decades, with rates more than qua-
drupling since the late 1960s.56
Studies have shown a direct correlation between family
structure and juvenile delinquency; juveniles who live with both
biological parents have lower crime rates across the board.57
Likewise, such drastic modifications to the nuclear family struc-
50. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court
Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver ofJuvenile Jurisdiction, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J.
629, 629-30 (1994) (noting that as early as the early 1970s, the New York Times
began to portray the ineffectiveness of the juvenile courts in dealing with vio-
lent crime).
51. Zierdt, supra note 47, at 413.
52. See Dilulio, supra note 8.
53. Births outside of marriage increased from five percent in 1960 to
twenty-two percent in 1985. Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in
the Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1993, 1994 (1993). By the year 2000,
this rate had increased to thirty-three percent in the United States. Herbert S.
Klein, Population: The Changing American Family, HOOVER DIG.,June 2004, at 177,
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3020821.htmi.
54. Klein, supra note 53, at 180-81
55. Melton, supra note 53, at 1994.
56. Id.
57. SeeJUVENIE OFFENDERS AND VICnMS, supra note 43, at 72 (providing
data illustrating that in the categories of gang membership, assault, drug use or
dealing, vandalism, and theft, crime rates for those living with both biological
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ture-or as one writer described it, the "flight from the nuclear
family" 5 -are likely to lead to increased disconnection from
familiar social supports. Certainly, as the rates of multi-income
households continue to increase, and as the rates of single
mothers continue to increase, there is limited time to even get to
know one's neighbors, much less time enough to develop close
relationships which facilitate networks of social support. When
there is a loss in connectedness between neighbors or commu-
nity members, individuals are more likely to feel unsafe in their
surroundings and increasingly view their neighbors (or the
greater community) with remote disinterest, or even fear.5" Con-
sequently, it becomes easier to frame a juvenile criminal, entirely
divorced from one's realm of association or experience, as a
monster to be guarded against rather than a vulnerable member
of society to be viewed with compassion.
A fourth factor involved in policy changes within the juve-
nile justice system has been a renewed emphasis on the Ameri-
can ideals of individual responsibility and self-determination. 60
In many respects this emphasis is not surprising, considering the
tenets underlying the founding and heritage of the United
States. At the root of societal emphasis on individual responsibil-
ity and self-determination is what one writer calls "self-individuat-
ing liberalism."6 This idea, which links freedom to "the
discovery, development, and expression of each individual's
unique self," stretches back to the influences of preeminent phi-
losophers Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and John Stu-
art Mill.6 2 There are two strands of self-individuating liberalism;
one strand, modeled by Rousseau, conceived authentic individ-
ual expression to be the summit of liberty.6 3 Heavily influenced
by Rousseau, Mill later argued in his seminal text On Liberty that
parents are five to fifteen percent lower than for those in other living
situations).
58. David Popenoe, Family Decline in America, in REBUILDING THE NEST: A
NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY 39, 40 (David Blankehorn et al.
eds., 1990).
59. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (illustrating the trend in disconnec-
tion from family, friends, and neighbors and the effects on corresponding
communities).
60. Lawrence Friedman writes of "the exaggerated individualism of twen-
tieth-century Americans," and its expression in the criminal justice system as a
"deep concern ... for individual responsibility" for criminal acts. LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 438, 443 (1993).
61. J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional
Thought, 45 B.C. L. REv. 499, 561 (2004).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 565-66.
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the individual must be free from government control in his opin-
ions and actions as long as they do not harm others.64 Further-
more, according to Mill, choices are not merely passive
preferences but represent an active quality through which per-
sons define and develop themselves.65
In line with Mill, the American Founders' vision for the
nation consisted of, as one scholar notes, "private individuals
standing in private relationships with one another, each with a
right to make of himself as much as he wished and could, and
each responsible for his choices and actions, good and bad
alike."66 Such a vision likely served as a prime motivation for the
Constitution's exaltation of the inalienable right to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. Some years later, Transcendentalist
figures such as Henry David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson
picked up on the self-individuating liberalism of Rousseau and
Mill, firmly cementing their ideas in the American heritage.
Emerson once wrote, "[I]nsist on yourself; never imitate. Your
own gift you can present every moment with the cumulative force
of a whole life's cultivation .... Every great man is a unique."67
This notion of freedom, and the romanticism of the possibilities
an individual may seize, remains firmly embedded in American
culture. The concept of the "American Dream" serves as a fore-
most example-the individual, it is believed, can make whatever
of herself that she wishes. Youths are commonly encouraged to
dream big and to follow those dreams (regardless of a dream's
rationality).
The second strand of self-individuating liberalism, in con-
trast to romanticism, stems from the rationalist thought of
Immanuel Kant. Kant emphasized in his writings that freedom is
guided by reason-that is, to be free means to embrace the uni-
versal capacity for detached decision making.6" Through the cul-
64. Mill writes: "The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individu-
ally or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their num-
ber, is self-protection." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Alburey Castell ed.,
Harlan Davidson 1947) (1859).
65. Hill, supra note 61, at 563.
66. Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recovering
Our Founding Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 507, 513 (1993).
67. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS, FIRST SERIES (1841),
reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS, LECTURES AND POEMS 148, 168 (Robert D. Richard-
son, Jr. ed., 1990).
68. Hill, supra note 61, at 565. American admiration for rationalist
thought of this type is illustrated by the selection as heroes of individuals
embodying a rationalist mindset. As one example, Tour de France champion
and cancer survivor Lance Armstrong is viewed as a hero for his ability to define
himself through sheer willpower.
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tivation of reason, according to Kant, the will can resist and
overcome the more emotive human motivations.69 Kant's ration-
alist thought can be said to have been incorporated in the Ameri-
can mindset via reliance on natural law. In the formation of the
new American government, the Founders premised that there
was a higher law of right and wrong, grounded in and discovera-
ble by human reason.7" While it is doubtful that incorporation of
the natural law tradition in toto into the political framework of
the nation was the intention of the Founders,71 it enabled them
to speak of rights that must, in accordance with higher law, be
granted respect. In turn, because each person was said to possess
these rights, and because these rights were deemed comprehen-
sible by human reason, high emphasis was placed on the ability
of the individual to map his own destiny.
Both strands of self-individuating liberalism, in placing a
premium on the autonomy of the self and in glorifying individu-
ality, are implicitly echoed in the modem trends of juvenile jus-
tice. 2  The values of individual responsibility and self-
determination, in my view, play an essential role in the framing
of U.S. juvenile justice policy because they serve as primary justifi-
cations for the stiff penalties regularly doled out to juvenile
offenders. Due to the renewed reliance on these principles
today, the sentencing of a fourteen-year-old to life in prison can
be rationalized as a consequence of that youth's "free choice" to
engage in criminal behavior. 73
69. Id.
70. Pilon, supra note 66, at 509.
71. Though the idea of natural law was undeniably an influence on the
content of such founding documents as the Declaration of Independence, this
does not imply that the Founders firmly planted themselves within the tradition
or were well versed in the writings of natural law scholars. Rather, it merely
illustrates that the natural law had a legitimate place in the thinking of the
Founders. R.H. Helmholz, The Law of Nature and the Early History of Unenumerated
Rights in the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401, 407 (2007).
72. Conversely, under both strands of self-individuating liberalism, the
Progressive Era reforms would be viewed with distaste and paternalism and
understood as an indication of the decline of individuality. Hill, supra note 61,
at 570.
73. I offset the term "free choice" with quotation marks because the true
freedom of such choice is debatable. Pages of analysis could be devoted to the
issue; this Note, however, will not enter that fray.
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III. A CONCILIATORY VOICE: CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING
7 4
The competing sets of values that have spurred the juvenile
court's transformation from the role of caretaker to the role of
enforcer over the past century illustrate a juxtaposition of the
values of rehabilitation and reintegration against the values of
retribution, deterrence, and public safety. These sets of values
need not be viewed as polar opposites. Neither set, standing
alone, holistically or satisfactorily addresses the complex issues
surrounding juvenile justice; steady dissatisfaction with the juve-
nile justice system over the past century seems to suggest that
many would agree. As for the original juvenile justice system, his-
tory itself-in the form of drastic changes to the system-illus-
trates that the means and ends of the original system were not
deemed satisfactory. Despite the idealism of the Progressive Era
reformers, juvenile delinquents lacked protection of their consti-
tutional rights, and the public eventually perceived that the sys-
tem was not really solving the problem ofjuvenile crime. 7' As for
the current "get tough" model of juvenile justice," one need to
only scan the myriad of commentary on the problems of and pos-
sible reforms for the juvenile justice system to recognize current
dissatisfaction. And while the general public may be satisfied that
juvenile delinquents are being punished for their crimes, one
would be hard pressed to suggest that the problems of juvenile
crime have been solved.77
A. A Basic Overview of Catholic Social Teaching
While any juvenile justice system is likely to have its short-
comings, current juvenile courts would be well served by bring-
ing together many of the qualities of the two competing sets of
values that have influenced the system over the past century.
Contrary to popular perception, conciliation between these val-
ues is possible when viewed through the lens of Catholic Social
Teaching. While not providing a blueprint for specific juvenile
justice reform, the foundational principles of Catholic Social
Teaching-namely human dignity, solidarity, and subsidiarity-
provide a framework from which to rethink the aims of the juve-
74. The terms "Catholic Social Teaching," "Catholic Social Thought,"
and "Catholic Social Doctrine" are used interchangeably throughout this Note
to refer to the body of the Catholic Church's social teachings.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
76. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
77. Though juvenile crime arrest rates have consistently decreased since
1994, there were still approximately 2.2 million arrests of persons under eigh-
teen in 2003. JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS, supra note 43, at 125. Likewise,
one in twelve murders in 2002 involved juvenile offenders. Id. at 65-66.
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nile courts that would allow for a more holistic, just response to
juvenile crime.
In some respects, Catholic Social Teaching marks its origin
with Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum ("The Condition
of Labor") in 1891, which was written in response to a growing
need of the Church to be included as a voice of commentary and
guidance on the pertinent social issues of the day.7 8 Of course,
Rerum Novarum did not really signal the true beginning of the
Church's social teachings, as the principles of such teachings
were to be found in the Scriptures and were developed through
Church doctrine throughout the centuries. Nevertheless, the
encyclical initiated a tradition of popes applying the wisdom of
the Church to the world's social problems, thus officially mark-
ing the beginning of a set of documents that combine to form
the Church's social doctrine. Today, the body of writings com-
prising the Church's Social Teaching has, as one writer suggests,
come to "communicate a vision of the church as servant to
humanity, a renewed concern for the human person and human
rights, [and] an increasing emphasis on popular participation.""9
As mentioned, Catholic Social Teaching is rooted, first and
foremost, in the Christian Scriptures. Beginning with Genesis,
humans are said to be made in God's image: "Then God said,
'And now we will make human beings; they will be like us and
resemble us.' ... So God created human beings, making them to
be like himself. He created them male and female."8 " Thus, the
question of who man is directly ties back to who God is. As one
writer notes,
If a human is 'the being related to God' then it follows in
an analogous (more unequal than equal, but still real)
manner that a human has a part of the characteristics of
God. Everything that one can say of God, also has a mean-
ing for humans and their concept of themselves.
8
'
In a society historically dominated by Christian believers, this
may not seem a novel idea at first glance. But the import of such
an idea, if taken seriously, is quite remarkable. It means that each
78. Thomas A. Shannon, Commentary on Rerum Novarum (The Condition of
Labor), in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETA-
TIONS 127, 127 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2004).
79. David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon, Introduction to CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 1, 1 (David J. O'Brien &
Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
80. Genesis 1:26-27 (Good News Translation).
81. L. Roos, The Human Person and Human Dignity as a Basis of the Social
Doctrine of the Church, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 53, 54 (David
A. Boileau ed., 1998).
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individual is to be respected not only as an autonomous being
with certain rights and liberties (as Kant or Mill, and the United
States Founding Fathers would conceive), but more fundamen-
tally as a creature with irreducible value on account of her shar-
ing in God's nature. In the Christian faith, the relationship
between the nature of God and humanity is particularly made
evident in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Briefly stated, the
Christian message as delivered through the person of Jesus was
that the suffering that marked the lives of people was not the
ultimate reality; rather, through Jesus' proclamation of the king-
dom of God, believers placed their hope in a superior reality of
redemption.82
From these primary tenets of the Christian faith flows the
fundamental principle of Catholic Social Teaching-human dig-
nity. In his encyclical Pacem in Terris, which provides perhaps the
fullest general treatment of political morality in the body of Cath-
olic Social Teaching, Pope John XXIII emphasizes the impor-
tance of human dignity as a foundation for the workings of
society. He writes:
Any well-regulated and productive association of men
in society demands the acceptance of one fundamental
principle: that each individual man is truly a person. His is
a nature, that is, endowed with intelligence and free will.
As such he has rights and duties, which together flow as a
direct consequence from his nature. These rights and
duties are universal and inviolable, and therefore alto-
gether inalienable.
When, furthermore, we consider man's personal dig-
nity from the standpoint of divine revelation, inevitably our
estimate of it is incomparably increased. Men have been
ransomed by the blood of Jesus Christ. Grace has made
them sons and friends of God, and heirs to eternal glory.83
While much of the above quote echoes the words of the Declara-
tion of Independence, Pope John's words are set apart by an
emphasis not only on rights, but duties. While human dignity
requires that one be able to choose one's own actions,84 this invi-
olable dignity also necessitates that society members "be
animated by such love as will make them feel the needs of others
as their own. ''85 Likewise, the understanding of human dignity
82. O'Brien & Shannon, supra note 79, at 2.
83. POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERMIS: PEACE ON EARTH paras. 9-10
(1963) [hereinafter PACEM IN TERIS].
84. Id. par-a. 34.
85. Id. para. 35.
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through the lens of Catholic Social Teaching is differentiated
from a secular understanding of rights in that the rights and
duties granted to each individual predate any sort of social con-
tract. The person is at all times understood in Catholic Social
Teaching as the "source, subject, and goal" of all social
conduct.8 6
A second principle of Catholic Social Teaching, closely tied
to the fundamental principle of human dignity, is solidarity. The
term "solidarity" is a relatively recent term in the Christian tradi-
tion, 7 but, like Catholic Social Teaching as a whole, its roots are
firmly planted in Scripture. Literally meaning "an entire union of
interests and responsibilities in a group,"8 John XXIII describes
solidarity as "bind [ing] all men together as members of a com-
mon family."8 9 The principle is presented in the pivotal Vatican
II document Gaudium et Spes as an expression of both justice and
love, which can be best fulfilled by "contribut[ing] to the com-
mon good according to one's means and the needs of others,
and also [by] promot[ing] and help[ing] public and private
organizations devoted to bettering the conditions of life."9 ° As a
principle that calls for the recognition of human interconnected-
ness, solidarity is an implicit rejection of secular individualism. In
fact, Pope John Paul II understood the act of embracing solidar-
ity to be transformative, leading one in precisely the opposite
direction from individualistic self-determination. In his encyclical
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, John Paul writes that the principle of soli-
darity prompts a human "to take on the specifically Christian
dimension of total gratuity, forgiveness and reconciliation."91
Further, he states, solidarity leads one to "'lose oneself for the
sake of the other instead of exploiting him, and to 'serve him'
instead of oppressing him for one's own advantage."92
While the principle of solidarity implicitly rejects individual-
ism, the third key principle of Catholic Social Teaching, sub-
86. Roos, supra note 81, at 57.
87. J. Verstraeten, Solidarity and Subsidiarity, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING 133, 133 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998).
88. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 2169 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986).
89. POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA: CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL PRO-
GRESS para. 157 (1961) [hereinafter MATER ET MAGISTRA].
90. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION
ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD para. 30 (1965), reprinted in VATICAN
COUNCIL II: CONSTITUTIONS, DECREES, DECLARATIONS 195 (Austin Flannery ed.,
1996) [hereinafter GAUDIUM ET SPES].
91. POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICrrUDo REI SOCL.Ls: ON SOCIAL CONCERN
para. 40 (1987).
92. Id. para. 38.
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sidiarity, is a rejection of individualism's inverse-collectivism."3
As originally discussed in Pope Pius XI's encyclical Quadragesimo
Anno, the principle of subsidiarity holds:
[I] t is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed
and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from
individuals and commit to the community what they can
accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it
is an injustice, and at the same time a grave evil and a dis-
turbance of right order to transfer to the larger and higher
collectivity functions which can be performed and pro-
vided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. 4
Though solidarity may be easily comprehended as rooted in
Christian principles, subsidiarity may be a bit more difficult to
grasp. Why is it that Catholic Social Thought considers collective
action not just inefficient, but a "grave evil," when individuals or
subordinate bodies are able to complete the task at hand? The
answer lies again in looking back to Catholic Social Teaching's
foundational principle, human dignity. If the collective body
(often, the State) takes upon itself tasks that are normally left to
individuals, smaller bodies of government, or informal associa-
tions, there is a grave threat that the collective body may in effect
"destroy or absorb" the individual members.95 Collectivism thus
threatens to make individuals the instruments of the State, rather
than preserving the proper role-consonant with the recogni-
tion of human dignity-of the State as servant of the people. 6
Beyond the dangers of collectivism, subsidiarity is empha-
sized in Catholic Social Teaching because it best allows for
human flourishing. For one, the principle of solidarity is not
likely to be realized if the collective body provides disincentives
for individual initiative and expression. In such a society, motiva-
tion to give of oneself for another is diminished, since the collec-
tive body purports to take it upon itself to provide. As John Paul
II writes in Centesimus Annus, "By intervening directly and depriv-
93. Verstraeten, supra note 87, at 133.
94. POPE PIus XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO: ON RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
SocuAi ORDER para. 79 (1931) [hereinafter QUADRAGESIMO ANNO].
95. Id.
96. This distrust of the State is not surprising, considering the encyclical
was written during the rise of Mussolini and during the beginnings of the con-
solidation of the Russian communist regime. Likewise, John Paul II, who simi-
larly emphasized the importance of the principle of subsidiarity during his
pontificate, personally lived through the horrors of both Nazi and communist
regimes as a Polish youth.
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ing society of its responsibility, the social assistance state leads to
a loss of human energies . .. .""
Additionally, Pius XI understood subsidiarity to be valuable
as an engine for reconstructing the social order. Through the
creation and sustaining of a social fabric held together by small
associations of people and other "prosperous and independent
institutions," social authority will become more effective.9" Fur-
ther, unless the individual is granted freedom and responsibility
consonant with one's inherent dignity, the broader social organ-
ism cannot prosper. In a statement drawing on the Apostle Paul's
discussion of the Body of Christ in his Letter to the Romans, Pius
XI writes in Divini Redemptori.
U] ust as in the living organism it is impossible to provide
for the good of the whole unless each single part and each
individual member is given what it needs for the exercise
of its proper functions, so it is impossible to care for the
social organism and the good of society as a unit unless
each single part and each individual member-that is to
say, each individual in the dignity of his human personal-
ity-is supplied with all that is necessary for the exercise of
his social functions.99
B. Bringing the Principles of Catholic Social Teaching to Bear
on the Juvenile Justice System
As previously stated, Catholic Social Doctrine fails to provide
a blueprint either for the criminal justice system or for the politi-
cal organization of the State. This, of course, is intentional, as
Jesus' message offered no specific form of government or eco-
nomic system as superior. At the same time, the Church has
never intended to present Christ's message in a vacuum, sealed
off from the concerns of the world. To the contrary, though
according to Scripture the fullness of Christ's message is not to
be realized until the Second Coming, °° the work of redemption
97. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS: ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVER-
SARY OF Rerum Novarum para. 48 (1991). This is not to say, however, that govern-
mental social assistance is frowned upon per se in Catholic Social Thought. John
XXIII emphasized in Mater et Magistra that the State can play a positive role if it
.encourages, stimulates, regulates, supplements, and complements" and is
"based on the principle of subsidiarity." MATER ET MAGISTRA, supra note 89, at
para. 53.
98. QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 94, at para. 78.
99. POPE Pius X1, DIVINI REDEMPTORIS: ON ATHEISTIC COMMUNISM para.
51 (1937).
100. Christ's Second Coming is referenced throughout the Christian
Scriptures, most notably in Matthew 16:27 ("For the Son of man is to come with
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is believed to be present and ongoing. Thus, the teachings of the
Church, including the Church's Social Doctrine, are intended to
influence societal structures.
The key principles of Catholic Social Thought outlined
above provide bases for critiques of elements of both paradigms
of juvenile justice that have been dominant throughout the past
century in the United States. As to the ideals of the Progressive
Era, surely much is consonant with the principles of Catholic
Social Teaching-particularly the principle of solidarity. In fact,
though they may not have named it as such, the Progressive
reformers were likely motivated by solidarity. The treatment of
the nation's youth, they witnessed, was abhorrent and embarrass-
ing. Instead of allowing youth to undergo the same harsh punish-
ment that their adult counterparts were receiving for their
crimes, the reformers believed society had a responsibility to look
after, rehabilitate, and reintegrate these troubled youths. Thus,
their motivations and actions were consistent with the urging of
the Second Vatican Council in Gaudium et Spes several decades
later to take common responsibility in improving the living con-
ditions of those that were falling through the cracks.1°'
Likewise, it could be argued that the principle of subsidiarity
was respected in the original juvenile justice system. The stated
aim of the system was, as Julian Mack put it, for the State to take
responsibility for a child when the child's family was unable or
unwilling to provide proper care or development. 0 2 In theory,
the idea of parens patriae is in harmony with Pope John XXIII's
vision in Mater et Magistra of the State as a support and comple-
ment of the more immediate familial or community units. In
practice, though, it is likely that the State often overstepped its
bounds, at least when viewed in light of the aims of subsidiarity.
Rather than acting as a true complement to the family unit, the
State surely exerted its own will in the face of good-faith objec-
tions from a troubled youth's family, reforming the child in the
his angels in the glory of his Father, and then he will repay every man for what
he has done.") and Matthew 25:31-32, 46 ("When the Son of man comes in his
glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his glorious throne. Before
him will be gathered all the nations, and he will separate them one from
another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats .... And they [the
goats] will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal
life.").
101. See GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 90, para. 30.
102. See supra text accompanying note 16.
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state's view of what was important. 103 Such behavior, if occurring,
would be contrary to the aims of subsidiarity.
Despite the good intentions of the Progressives, and despite
the admirable attempt to put into practice the principle of soli-
darity (and perhaps subsidiarity, to some degree), it is questiona-
ble whether the Progressive vision-and the resulting juvenile
justice system-was really in line with the foundational principle
of human dignity. In some respects, of course, the system estab-
lished by the reformers was entirely reflective of the dignity of
the troubled youth they sought to treat. The juveniles that
entered the system were treated paternally, it could be argued,
precisely because they were seen as valuable. Nevertheless, sev-
eral aspects of the original juvenile courts were at odds with the
dignity of its subjects. First, juveniles were not granted any consti-
tutional rights in the juvenile courts, nor were there established
procedures for determining each juvenile's required treat-
ment. °4 The Progressives were well aware of this, of course, but
found it necessary in order to prevent youths' perceptions that
their sentences involved punishment. What resulted, as discussed
above, was drastically disparate treatment of juveniles who com-
mitted the same crime, depending on their circumstances." °5
Such a denial of fairness violated a right purportedly extended by
the Constitution to all. 10 6 More so, this sort of disparate treat-
ment reflected a deterministic view of individuals as pure prod-
ucts of their environment. Viewing youth in this way is at odds
with the Catholic understanding of human dignity, which places
great emphasis on intelligence and free will.
The system established by the Progressive reformers also
strayed from the principle of human dignity in refusing condem-
nation of crimes committed and in denying juvenile culpabil-
ity. 107 In doing so, all sense of moral responsibility for one's
103. Commenting on the court's overbearing nature, one writer notes
that the juvenile court "flunked parents just as the public school flunked chil-
dren." SCHLOSSMA , supra note 21, at 58.
104. See supra text accompanying note 32.
105. See Feld, supra note 20, at 872-73.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
107. One writer viewed this as the most profound failure of the juvenile
justice system. He writes:
If there is no element of culpability then what effectuates society's
moral condemnation for the acts committed? Without the moral con-
demnation of society, how is the actor to be informed that his actions
are deemed wrong? How does a youth come to understand the mean-
ing of right and wrong when he is not blamed for his actions, yet may
well know that another actor, of major age, would be?
Kamenstein, supra note 10, at 2134.
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actions is negated, and as a result the moral development of
youth offenders is likely stunted. While there is merit to studies
questioning the decision-making capacity of juveniles,1 °8 a com-
plete negation of moral responsibility-in all circumstances-
clearly cuts against respect for the inherent dignity of the juve-
nile actors. From a Christian perspective, the story of salvation
(and of human nature) is one of both sin and redemption; while
shame is not good in itself, it is valued as an ingrained response
to failure and as an impetus to conversion. By denying the capac-
ity of juveniles to choose between right and wrong, the original
juvenile courts encouraged a distorted understanding of human
nature, thus denoting disrespect for ajuvenile's inherent dignity.
The modern era of juvenile justice brought reform in a
couple of the areas of deficiency espoused by the early juvenile
courts. For one, with the Supreme Court's rulings in Gault and
Kent, juveniles were provided procedural safeguards guaranteed
to them by the Constitution that had previously been with-
held.1"9 As argued above, this seemed to be a step in the right
direction and was consonant with respect for the dignity of juve-
nile offenders. Likewise, "punishment" in the modern era of
juvenile justice is no longer a dirty word, and society clearly com-
municates its moral condemnation for crimes committed. While,
as I will argue below, the emphasis and extent of punishment of
juvenile crime has extended well beyond bounds of appropriate-
ness, the fact that youths' moral responsibility for their actions is
taken seriously, as a preliminary matter, is consistent with the rec-
ognition of their dignity.
Though juvenile justice has arguably made some strides, its
reforms have ultimately failed when considered in light of the
principles of Catholic Social Teaching. First, neither solidarity
nor subsidiarity are given much credence in the structure and
aims of the currentjuvenile courts. While the Progressive reform-
ers understood society's common responsibility towards wayward
youths, the modern approach to juvenile justice consistently
abrogates such responsibility. This is made clear through the will-
ingness of the courts to sentence offenders to life sentences in
prison, often without opportunity for parole. 1 Truly, for the
thousands of juveniles given such sentences, society has effec-
108. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defend-
ants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 3 (1997); Cynthia V. Ward, Punishing Children
in the Criminal Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429 (2006); National Institute of
Mental Health, Teenage Brain: A Work in Progress (2001), http://nimh.nih.
gov/publicat/teenbrain.cfm.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29.
110. See supra text accompanying note 1.
RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
tively communicated that the offending juvenile is no longer wor-
thy of reintegration, regardless of possible repentance and
transformation, even forty or fifty years down the road. Such
treatment is in stark contrast with the principle of solidarity
which, in recognition of human interconnectedness, calls forth
selflessness for the sake of one's neighbor. The principle of sub-
sidiarity is likewise overlooked, as a juvenile justice system with
such punitive measures places higher value in serving the secur-
ity needs of the collective body rather than the needs of the
offending individual, guilty though he may be of his crime. While
it is certainly a duty of the State to provide protection for its citi-
zens, doing so at the cost of denigrating and overly-harsh puni-
tive sentences, with disregard for the offending youth, leaves an
imbalance that is out of line with subsidiarity.
Altogether, the current treatment ofjuvenile offenders illus-
trates a lack of respect for human dignity. Despite strides in rec-
ognition of a juvenile's moral responsibility for his actions,
treatment of offenders appears to be motivated more by fear
rather than concern. While the Progressive Era reformers may
have communicated a lack of respect for the dignity of youth
offenders by failing to recognize their abilities of moral reason-
ing and free choice, the modern era has effectively relied on
individual responsibility to justify, in many instances, complete
societal disregard for youths who have made poor choices.
C. Possible Solutions
The core principles of Catholic Social Teaching present a
third way to envision societal treatment of juvenile offenders-
one that brings together the best of both of the traditional para-
digms for juvenile justice. In light of Catholic Social Teaching's
principles, there are three distinct ways in which the juvenile jus-
tice system-and society at large-could more effectively, and
justly, react to the problems of juvenile crime. First, in line with
the ideals of the Progressive reformers and the principle of soli-
darity, society at large (and in turn the mechanisms within states'
respective juvenile justice systems) must take on a renewed sense
of responsibility for youth offenders. The role of the State as
parens patriae, while overly paternalistic in the form envisioned by
the Progressive reformers, should be emphasized with renewed
vigor. Americans have traditionally prided themselves on their
collective abilities to assist those in need, and there is no reason
to presume it would not be possible for committed advocates to
incite the public conscience and work for reform in this area.
The emphasis by politicians of "getting tough" on youth crime is
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motivated, surely, by the desires and values of their constituents.
Were the public to speak loudly and clearly about the common
responsibility to take care of our nation's troubled youth,
undoubtedly states' juvenile justice systems would change to
reflect greater compassion for youth offenders, refocusing puni-
tive efforts on the eventual goals of reintegration and rehabilita-
tion as primary aims.
Second, in order to more holistically achieve true reintegra-
tion and reconciliation, the juvenile courts must continue to
focus on the moral blameworthiness of actions taken, so as to
refrain from denigrating the dignity of the offenders themselves
(or, for that matter, the victims of their crimes). Furthermore, in
line with the principle of dignity, reintegration should never be
sought at the expense of the recognition of-and most often
some form of penance for-the wrongfulness of conduct that
occurred. While diminished moral capacity should be taken into
account, communication of right and wrong must not be
marginalized, as doing so would be contrary to the moral devel-
opment of the offending youth. Shame can be an impetus for the
recognition of wrongful conduct and eventual reform and thus
should not be smothered by the state authority, as was the ten-
dency in the Progressive Era. Thus, traditional American values
of individual responsibility and self-determination should con-
tinue to be emphasized, though in moderation; such values must
not be used as a justification to de-humanize youth offenders as
"super-predators," canceling out solidarity and community
responsibility aims and ignoring the intrinsic dignity of the
juvenile.
Third, on an informal societal level, there must be a
renewed emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity. The family
and community breakdown over the last several decades has
been remarkable, and there appears to be no end in sight to the
isolation of individuals and families from one another. Still, indi-
viduals must take it upon themselves to build organic support
systems in their communities. Without rebuilding networks
where neighbors can rely on one another, and without families
committed to each other, public perception of juvenile crime is
not likely to change, and fear among disassociated community
members will continue to motivate the societal approach tojuve-
nile offenders. Government, likewise, while strengthening its
own role as parens patriae, must develop mechanisms and avenues
for the encouragement of the formation and strengthening of
informal, organic societal units. Out of respect for the potential-
ity of human ingenuity and initiative, the State must attempt to
provide room for communities to take it upon themselves to
RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
work for solutions to the problems of juvenile crime. One possi-
ble practical solution is to emphasize restorative justice, enabling
offenders and victims to together achieve reconciliation and
understanding.1"'
CONCLUSION
It would be naive to suggest that the problems of juvenile
crime can be solved easily. Since the idealistic reforms of the Pro-
gressive Era near the turn of the twentieth century, the fabric of
American society-and the nature of juvenile violence-has
undoubtedly become more complex. Despite these complexities,
current societal treatment of juvenile offenders should once
again incite moral outrage, as it did for Dorothea Dix, Jane
Addams, and their companions. The current state of American
juvenile justice reflects, at best, an inadvertent disregard for the
care and development of future generations. At worst, it signals a
collective selfishness and a conscious disassociation with those
youths that are most in need of community, rationalized by a
casting of such individuals as somehow less than human.
The values of the modern era ofjuvenile justice need not be
cast entirely aside, however. A traditional emphasis on individual
responsibility and self-determination is unavoidably a part of
American heritage and is not likely to go away-nor should it, so
long as such values are tempered by a strong dose of communal
responsibility and aims of reconciliation, rehabilitation, and rein-
tegration. The foundational principles of Catholic Social Teach-
ing-which, though rooted in the Catholic tradition, are widely
applicable-provide a bedrock for bringing these different sets
of aims, seemingly in conflict with one another throughout the
history of the juvenile courts, together as one.
111. For more information about restorative justice, which seeks to
restore victims, offenders, and their communities from the effects of crime
through the use of victim-offender mediation, see generallyJOHN BRAITHWAITE,
CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); REPAIRING COMMUNITIES THROUGH
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (John G. Perry ed., 2002); John Braithwaite, Restorative Jus-
tice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME &JUST. 1 (1999); Mark
S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the 21st Century: A Social Movement Full of
Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REv. 251 (2006).
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